What do state and national gun-rights organizations know that we don't? re: support

[MDJschool]

The number one way right-to-bear-arms related causes see support from state and national arms-rights organizations, it seems to me, is by suit. Often but not always do the organizations groom a 'perfect plaintiff', and any cause for which they may support but do not come as counsel or plaintiff themselves, they come as amicus curiae, but usually only when the issue has reached the state high court or a federal circuit. My readings have seen it rare that these organizations come at the right time in criminal cases, if at all. What do these organizations know that we do not?

Here's what I know: when I read district and circuit cases involving guns, plaintiffs get shit upon. When I read PA cases seeking injunctions, often plaintiffs get shit upon. I see the lack of rigor in the civil realm cause so many issues to be waived and lost. I realize that the fight for respect for our arms-related rights is always an excruciatingly uphill battle this day in age, but I wonder: have we been looking at this through blinders?

Why do we need a perfect plaintiff when a decent defendant will suffice? I keep going through Pennsylvania criminal procedure in my head, over and over -- how is this asset going untapped? It is a whole avenue, in my opinion one better suited for the very purpose of advancing rights, in a forum that is wholly more amenable to retaining issues without succumbing to summary judgment, and is more sympathetic to constitutional challenges. The rigor of criminal procedure is only an asset to the person or organization that wants to advance the rights, and the government officials are much less affronted by the whole thing! This can only be good.

In suit there is always a government official or organization to be targeted. In the course of advancing our rights, there is a person or body who will lose money, or be impaired by the courts to do what they might believe is an essential part of their jobs. It would be foolhardy to believe public officials would take this lightly, even though the administration of good government is hardly about them and their jobs -- they are just an obstacle, a bug to be fixed. Yet under the criminal procedure, the government officials are confused; in fact, they usual feel that they are in control of the whole thing, and that a defendant is on the defensive. While it may look like a district attorney spearheads a prosecution, sometimes a piece in play by a shadow government official that someone irked, these parties are unlikely to appreciate, not grave, but great position a defendant has been put into: the singular champion for a constitutional cause which no one can intercept. They do not expect constitutional challenges, and when they are given one, they rarely expect a defendant to win.

In suit a judge is more likely to perceive the interaction among the parties as civil interaction goes, two parties with their private interested. This perception may falter in favor of government officials -- after all, they are targeted. Could not the judge be next? But a failed suit is not jeopardy of life or liberty. However we have luckily assimilated, if nothing else, especial due process intertwined with the criminal procedure. When it appears that the defendant is in jeopardy, and not a government official, judges are much more amenable to the arguments (even if they often deny them anyway). No public official is going suffer directly from this constitutional challenge; at worst, an Act or some part is whisked away. The interaction between, not a defendant and the district attorney, or the community, but a defendant and the GOVENRMENT, is given special regard. This is only to our advantange.

Because of the special regard, litigating the challenge to void statutes or construction thereof is given a rather protected and streamlined process. Make a motion at the trial court level, probably be given an opportunity to brief and/or have hearing, preserve the issue in either the interlocutory appeal or 1925(a) brief, and you are entitled to litigate it (if it in any way possible could possibly be deemed meritorious, and sometimes that is not even necessary) in the court of first appeal. There is no summary judgment, no arbitrary dismissal of your claims. If you follow the rules, you are in; the judge(s) will review the claim on its merits.

But here's the catch, and what I feel these organizations don't truly appreciate: the current, single-greatest risk faced in this route is failure of organizations to attach at the earliest instance (i.e. trial court, following the motion that makes the challenge but before it is ruled upon.) These organizations are used to, in the cases where they have not groomed the party, waiting for the issue to reach upper courts. This strategy, while resource-conserving in CIVIL cases and which may be a sensible strategy, is so much more useless in the criminal procedure. Why? AVOIDANCE DOCTRINE!

Basically, an appellate court is likely to see the challenge to law by only two avenues: appeal FOLLOWING CONVICTION, or the appeal BY THE COMMONWEALTH after a successful constitutional challenge. Maybe that's why these organizations are sheepish, at least on the idea of grooming DEFENDANTS! There's a chance that a defendant will bitch out if he has to wait through a conviction to litigate the issue, and if there's not a belief BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT that the challenge will be successful, a post-conviction appeal has to include sub-constitutional issues that protect the defendant from a future of harm. Are you starting to see why organizations need to intervene early?

The most beautiful direction a case can take is success by constitutional fiat at the trial-court level prior to a conviction. There are unfortunately some less-enjoyable permutations of this: a prosecutor withdraws the charges, the Commonwealth fails to appeal. Striking down law at the trial court level is still more amazing that is apparently currently contemplated. Simply rinse and repeat - same or different county, same or different defendant, same challenge. If DAs keep getting shot down by trial courts, I presume that would be as an aggregate just about as effective as an appellate ruling! But suppose the Commonwealth is faced with the devastating loss, having been shutdown because they (in probably violating their oaths) prosecuted persons under Acts which are not law! Worried about their ability to prosecute in the future, they may be goaded into appealing. The only issue on appeal is constitutional issue. What could be avoided in a post-conviction appeal must be met SQUARELY by the appellate court. You will have your answer: either the judiciary will respect your rights, or they will show you another abuse or usurpation...

But why do we need state and national gun-rights organizations to get involved here? It's possible that their force can actually sway the unsteady hands of trial court judges. I tend to see that the judges at this level are prone not to the effect of special interests as we see them in our legislatures and upper judiciary, but rather these judges react to the managamy...the imagined idea...of these organizations. Of course, the possibility exists that intervention by the groups will cause the exact opposite: emotional recalcitrance -- that this judge will NOT be bullied by big 'special interest' organizations. But it is SO important to remember how needy a defendant and an organization is for a pre-conviction win in the criminal procedure! I think that amicus curiae will tip the scales more often than not. But where are these friends of the court? Have you ever seen them?

Of course, not every injury or fear can be assauged by the voiding of 'law' via criminal procedure. Suit is often necessary to address actual injury. The criminal procedure is excellent for full frontal assaults to statutes, instead of redressing specific injury while simultaneously effecting respect for the arms rights. Until DAs can be expected to prosecute official oppression and litigate the constitution while doing so, we now have our options. They just seem to be a bit more than the organizations would have us believe.

I am reminded of the so often applicable meme, readily applicable to the issue at hand:
"butterfly in the sky, i can go twice as high, take a look, it's in a book, reading rainbow
i can go anywhere, friends to know, ways to grow, a reading rainbow
i can be anything, take a look, it's in a book, reading rainbow (reading rainbow)"
And I think, couldn't Geordi LaForge be a poster child for the organizations taking on this 'new' avenue for HOPE and CHANGE? Just imagine his voice... "Here's some other ways to challenge the unconstitutional law... but you don't have to take my word for it!" (TAKE A LOOK, IT'S IN A BOOK!)

But the organizations aren't saying that, are they? They say 'but you DO have to take MY word for it.' Or maybe they aren't even saying that to us. It's their body language. Are they taking cases this way at all? Are they monitoring these cases? Why are they not tapping the full breadth of the internet to discover the cases as early as we do on this forum? If we are directly asking them to help these people we discover, what are they saying?

A full panoply of defendants is available and will forever be available and of use to us. There are those wholly uninterested in the cause, finding themselves trapped, but willing to take any way they can to get out of the charge (and without our help or that of these organizations, they will make the 'bad cases' that make 'base case law'). There are unfortunate defendants caught up in the strict exercise of their rights, bumbling but willing to receive guidance. There are defendants who take it upon themselves to challenge what they perceive to be unjust law so they can see it stricken down. And there are those, if not in actuality, then theoretically, groomed by organizations ready to fight. Organizations have their choice of as many of these, and perhaps ought to tap more of them, earlier than they have.

Please counterbalance me. The day is today. The organizations exist and are somewhat aware and somewhat responsive. Why is the criminal procedure, correctly understood, not part of their toolkits for the defense of liberty?

[MDJschool]

And may I add this addendum and afterthought, a bit departed from my main though adduced:

It baffles me that a lot of us would consider that we could lobby a legislature. At all. Ever.

That many of us think we can, and that some of us could be arsed to send an email, nay, fax, nay pick up a phone, NAY, VISIT OUR LEGISLATORS IN PERSON, nay, some of us go on to testify in hearings before committees, and to specially advise legislators... we are all lobbying, for an important cause but nonetheless lobbying, an officer with limited time and resources and a necessity to act decisively, supposedly under penalty of law or being voted out next time!

And yet, how many of us think about lobbying a different branch of the government? Why would we not consider lobbying a different branch of government, in the countless ways that are possibly to lobby them, under the customary procedures longstanding to do so? Those procedures are litigation - plaintiffs, and defendants, each in their unique position, to petition, the friends of the court who are at once friends of history or friends of advocacy, maybe occasionally we become the expert witness. These are but the forms of lobbying prescribed.

We normally don't take a truck with a horn to the door of a legislator and dictate our concerns and wishes (although maybe we ought to?) but we might take those same concerns and wishes and apply them to a piece of paper in the form of a letter, emailed, faxed, mailed, dictated, or hand-delivered. We might have used a certain format -- a form letter, block style. That is the customary procedure for addressing our legislators! How is that so different from writing an amicus brief, but in the requirements of form, and perhaps a slight difference in rigor? They lobby to each branch appropriately!

We can lobby to more than one branch!

[MDJschool]

I think I did too much glossing on avoidance doctrine, which is probably essential to the core of my complaint. In fact, I assume that if these organizations at least accepted the possibility of advancing constitutional law advocacy through the criminal procedure, the only reason they would fail to do so correctly is because the use by the judiciary of avoidance doctrine was not satisfactorily impressed upon them. Posters here are no less my audience, however, so a few snippets to make avoidance doctrine and its consequences clear, instead to only alluded:

"Because this Court will not address the constitutionality of an act of the legislature if there are other grounds for disposing of the issue, we will address appellee's alternative statutory claims first. See Boettger v. Loverro, 526 Pa. 510, 518, 587 A.2d 712, 715 (1991) (when serious doubt of constitutionality of a statute is raised, this Court will first look to construe the statute in a way that avoids the constitutional question)." Com., Dept. of Transp. v. McCafferty, 758 A.2d 1155, 1159 (Pa. 2000).

The dilemma is as follows. A defendant seeking to strike down an Act is faced with jeopardy, often a high-graded misdemeanor or a felony, which will purport to subject him to prohibtion from firearms upon conviction or sentence. While he may be steadfast in his belief that the Act is unconstitutional, he cannot be sure that the public officials, so well known for their disregard of the constitutions, would prevent his reaching that stage of prohibition, even if his defense be well-erected. A defendant worried about the failure of his future and his guns, among other things, expect to be stolen from him, would most often prepare defenses at the trial court level other than the motion which seeks voidance of the Act, because if they are not set out at the trial court level, they are waived. The defendant cannot go to the first court of appeal, then, and assert only his argument on constitutionality, be denied, and then expect to raise his lesser defenses before the next court, because, having not asserted him at this next level, he has waived them. However, if he asserts both the argument of constitutionality and the lesser defenses simultaneously, the court can be expected, if possible, to resolve the jeopardy by finding for the defendant through the lesser defense -- the court will then wash it hands of the case without ever reaching the merits of the constitutional argument. It is suspected that most defendents, every ready to mount a challenge, will not forego at least one lesser defense in a post-conviction appeal scenario.

A seating of SCOTUS goes into a bit more detail into the history and reasoning behind this avoidance doctrine, at least from one perspective (as it was in the case):

From Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409, 1 L.Ed. 436, to Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co. and the Hatch Act case decided this term, this Court has followed a policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues. The earliest exemplifications, too well known for repeating the history here, arose in the Court's refusal to render advisory opinions and in applications of the related jurisdictional policy drawn from the case and controversy limitation. U.S.Const. Art. III. The same policy has been reflected continuously not only in decisions but also in rules of court and in statutes made appliable to jurisdictional matters including the necessity for reasonable clarity and definiteness, as well as for timeliness, in raising and presenting constitutional questions. Indeed perhaps the most effective implement for making the policy effective has been the certiorari jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Congress. E.g., Judicial Code, ss 237, 240, 28 U.S.C.A. ss 344, 347.

The policy, however, has not been limited to jurisdictional determinations. For, in addition, ‘the Court (has) developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.' Thus, as those rules were listed in support of the statement quoted, constitutional issues affecting legislation will not be determined in friendly, nonadversary proceedings; in advance of the necessity of deciding them; in broader terms than are required by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be applied; if the record presents some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of; at the instance of one who fails to show that he is injured by the statute's operation, or who has availed himself of its benefits; or if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.

Some, if not indeed all, of these rules have found ‘most varied applications.’[FN33. For example, with reference to the rule forbidding decision of properly presented constitutional questions, if the case may be disposed of on another ground: ‘Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191, 29 S.Ct. 451 (454), 455, 53 L.Ed. 753; Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538, 31 S.Ct. 485 (488) 55 L.Ed. 570. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground. Berea College v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53, 29 S.Ct. 33 (34), 53 L.Ed. 81.’ 297 U.S. at page 347, 56 S.Ct. at page 483, 80 L.Ed. 688.] And every application has been an instance of reluctance, indeed of refusal, to undertake the most important and the most delicate of the Court's functions, notwithstanding conceded jurisdiction, until necessity compels it in the performance of constitutional duty.

Moreover the policy is neither merely procedural nor in its essence dependent for applicability upon the diversities of jurisdiction and procedure, whether of the state courts, the inferior federal courts, or this Court. Rather it is one of substance,[FN34. ‘If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality * * * unless such adjudication is unavoidable.’ Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 154, 89 L.Ed. 101. It has long been the Court's ‘considered practice not to decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions * * * or to decide any constitutional question in advance of the necessity for its decision * * * or to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied * * * or to decide any constitutional question except with reference to the particular facts to which it is to be applied * * *.’ Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 1389, 89 L.Ed. 1725. ‘It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.’ Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295, 25 S.Ct. 243, 245, 49 L.Ed. 482.] grounded in considerations which transcend all such particular limitations. Like the case and controversy limitation itself and the policy against entertaining political questions,35 it is one of the rules basic to the federal system and this Court's appropriate place within that structure.

Indeed in origin and in practical effects, though not in technical function, it is a corollary offshoot of the case and controversy rule. And often the line between applying the policy or the rule is very thin. They work, within their respective and technically distinct areas, to achieve the same practical purposes for the process of constitutional adjudication, and upon closely related considerations.

The policy's ultimate foundations, some if not all of which also sustain the jurisdictional limitation, lie in all that goes to make up the unique place and character, in our scheme, of judicial review of governmental action for constitutionality. They are found in the delicacy of that function, particularly in view of possible consequences for others stemming also from constitutional roots; the comparative finality of those consequences; the consideration due to the judgment of other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their authority; the necessity, if government is to function constitutionally, for each to keep within its power, including the courts; the inherent limitations of the judicial process, arising especially from its largely negative character and limited resources of enforcement; withal in the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our system.

All these considerations and perhaps others, transcending specific procedures, have united to form and sustain the policy. Its execution has involved a continuous choice between the obvious advantages it produces for the functioning of government in all its coordinate parts and the very real disadvantages, for the assurance of rights, which deferring decision very often entails. On the other hand it is not altogether speculative that a contrary policy, of accelerated decision, might do equal or greater harm for the security of private rights, without attaining any of the benefits of tolerance and harmony for the functioning of the various authorities in our scheme. For premature and relatively abstract decision, which such a policy would be most likely to promote, have their part too in rendering rights uncertain and insecure.

As with the case and controversy limitation, however, the choice has been made long since. Time and experience have given it sanction. They also have verified for both that the choice was wisely made. Any other indeed might have put an end to or seriously impaired the distinctively American institution of judicial review. And on the whole, in spite of inevitable exceptions, the policy has worked not only for finding the appropriate place and function of the judicial institution in our governmental system but also for the preservation of individual rights.

Most recently both phases of its operation have been exemplified in declaratory judgment proceedings. Despite some seemingly widespread misconceptions, the general introduction of that procedure in both state and federal spheres has not reversed or modified the policy's general direction or effects.

One aspect of the policy's application, it has been noted, has been by virtue of the presence of other grounds for decision. But when such alternatives are absent, as in this case, application must rest upon considerations relative to the manner in which the constitutional issue itself is shaped and presented.

These cannot be reduced to any precise formula or complete catalogue. But in general, as we have said, they are of the same nature as those which make the case and controversy limitation applicable, differing only in degree. To the more usual considerations of timeliness and maturity, of concreteness, definiteness, certainty, and of adversity of interests affected, are to be added in cases coming from state courts involving state legislation those arising when questions of construction, essentially matters of state law, remain unresolved or highly ambiguous. They include, of course, questions of incorporation by reference and severability, such as this case involves. Necessarily whether decision of the constitutional issue will be made must depend upon the degree to which uncertainty exists in these respects. And this inevitably will vary with particular causes and their varying presentations.

Accordingly the policy's applicability can be determined only by an exercise of judgment relative to the particular presentation, though relative also to the policy generally and to the degree in which the specific factors rendering it applicable are exemplified in the particular case. It is largely a question of enough or not enough, the sort of thing precisionists abhor but constitutional adjudication nevertheless constantly requires. And it is this kind of question that the declaratory judgments procedure has facilitated in presentation, a consequence which dictates the greatest care in seeing that it be not utilized so as to become a means for nullifying the policy.

Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of City of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 568-574 (1947) (footnotes omitted except where exerpted).

[Huskyoverlord]

I breezed over it and you seem mad as hell for our government not following it's own law. I still get broken up about it but it seems now more then ever business and government say these happy feel good things about our freedoms and rights and how they respect us as humans but their actions say even louder that they could give a shit about our rights , well being , and being american! The system regulated it self out of exsitance about 10 years ago , we are just begining to see the repercussions of that now. Less laws means less crime. Hell the only people that seem to need to be told how to live are our "leaders" and the money men with their never ending greed that is like a cancer on this country's soul. Don't get me wrong I'm not anti business at all but you can only squeeze a dollar out of a dime for so long until collapse. Thank god 75% of americans are delusional and deluded that they keep the lie going that we haven't failed. I would rather admit we failed and fix the problem instead of limping along and being led like lemmings of the cliff!

[MDJschool]

I breezed over it and you seem mad as hell for our government not following it's own law. I still get broken up about it

I heard that someone was making audiobook versions of my posts so that users don't have to be troubled reading them.

Pardon me, the undertone of most of my posts is that I'm 'mad as hell for our government not following it's own law', and I would posit that it is the same for many of the posts on PAFOA. At this point you might even say it is the essence of PAFOA, where we cannot just associate and talk about firearms ownership but must deal with the implications of having a government.

However, I try to make my titles relevant, even if they are not always 'tight' (and I would agree that this one is not really tight, but I try to make them relevant when not completely appropriate. Sometimes this is a matter of round-about cunning.) This thread really is about state and national gun-rights organizations, and my plea is for some people to tell me what I'm missing as to why these organizations are not adopting a certain strategy. Ergo: "Please counterbalance me. The day is today. The organizations exist and are somewhat aware and somewhat responsive. Why is the criminal procedure, correctly understood, not part of their toolkits for the defense of liberty?"

That will either save you the trouble of a reread or entice you to go back and examine the blather in more careful detail.

[Huskyoverlord]

Sorry I go off subject alot. Can't say I don't agree with you. should the NRA be a rabid st. bernard named cujo in defense of our rights , yes they should be! I got blasted for talking bad about the NRA and I think you might like the gun owners of america better , they care about all firearms and don't bend to the nosense as much as the NRA does. Would it make me feel safer if my ex army neighbor with PTSD had a javilin missle launcher , yes!

[Huskyoverlord]

I'm sorry tried to read that legal statment but have a very low tolerance for bullshit. Please give me the jist of it.

[MDJschool]

I got blasted for talking bad about the NRA and I think you might like the gun owners of america better , they care about all firearms and don't bend to the nosense as much as the NRA does.

I did not write the OP with the NRA in mind, who to me has been effectively relegated to the same place as the Pennsylvania Peace Society. I wrote this looking at such national examples as SAF, GOA, JPFO and such state examples as PA-FOAC, ACSL, EPFC (LEVFC), PRPA...

I suspect that there must be a few issues going on that can be altogether be referred to as organizational inefficiencies. One problem, to which I already mentioned, is that I suspect the organizations are not coming upon the cases quickly enough, or there are not people dedicated to the collection, compilation, and dissemination of cases that arise. Without that information, the organization most certainly cannot act. However, I'm going to guess that in every case of this, there is neither a proactive membership with the appropriate initiative, or in its place, top officials attempting to actively delegate these tasks to what seems like the most active and capable members to undertake it. We at PAFOA pick up on cases somewhat quickly these days. We could reach out to the organizations? Do we? There is legwork involved, and doing it or not is the difference. It's the same between being for a cause and enacting the cause, as the member or the officer.

I suspect the same type of communication and resource-use issue comes up when the matter of whether to intervene comes up. Of course this will differ between grooming and either representing or acting as a party and simple acting as amicus curiae. However, the latter is the easiest and least intensive of the choice while still allowing the weight of the organization to lie. Old-school organizations will approach amicus participation as something their top members or attorneys have to formulate. In that case it would be expensive for the organization. But why not simply ask 10 members to come up with briefs, convene a committee for time-sensitive decision making for which the full quorum of members cannot be constituted to vote, and use the best one (if a best one presents itself?) Then the attorney cleans it up, and there is the brief for the organization. Is there more to it? There's a problem that exists among memberships. They want to do something while wanting to do nothing. So just like the identification of cases, the same lack of activity on the participatory front occurs when neither members step up and officials actively attempt to delegate. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure say that anyone can file an amicus brief without leave...so where are all the lobbyists, lobbying the judiciary like they would lobby the legislature? I feel like that is a gap organizations might want to pick up, and the organizations I listed above all hold up the 2A or Pa Const art. I sec. 21 as an independent reason for their existence or cause, beside whatever things related to firearms they might be interested in. These cases will pop up. These organizations can either guide them with their learned hand or let them pollute the pool of law, causes, and effects without it.

[MDJschool]

I did not write the OP with the NRA in mind, who to me has been effectively relegated to the same place as the Pennsylvania Peace Society. I wrote this looking at such national examples as SAF, GOA, JPFO and such state examples as PA-FOAC, ACSL, EPFC (LEVFC), PRPA...

Let's see if I can put this into perspective a bit. Let's grab a few factoids to play with.

Let's start with a national and a state organization who have goals I can coincide with what I'm trying to explain.
National - Gunowners of America: their gunowners.org DESCRIPTION meta tag notes that it 'is a non-profit lobbying organization formed in 1975'. GOA notes that "There are many reasons for a state to adopt a genuine right to carry law: 1. Carrying a firearm is a "right" not a "privilege"". Larry Pratt recently applauded Knoxville mayor, Bill Haslam, who said that he would sign a constitutional carry bill put before him. "GOA is considered the "no compromise" gun lobby."
State - Hard to find a suitable candidate: Getting quotes from state orgs regarding them taking specific issue with facially invalid laws is hard...so we'll work with GOA for now.

GOA seems to represent itself as a lobbying organization that would ideally achieve 'constitutional carry'. The goal here is to figure out where the opportunities were, and why GOA might not have taken them. (I'm not 100% sure if I will be able to examine this without having our imaginary GOA accept a mixed-win on the basis for constitutional carry among 50 states; some wins would be via state constitution, others by the 2A. Maybe that's an irreconcilable hurdle.)

1) Is GOA not interested in a single-state constitutional carry win?

Over the past few years I have seen no less than 3 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106 cases, 3 § 913 cases, and 3 § 912 cases, in which defendants were accused of no malicious, reckless, or negligent wrongdoing -- i.e. something that might harm someone. In most every case defendants had little, no, or a mitigated history of violence or other considerable crime, making them at the very least 'decent defendants'. Consider other cases that might come up, like a prosecution for having a firearm with an, or causing a firearm to have, an altered serial number, or a minor in possession of a firearms (ripe for a State v. Sieyes, 225 P.3d 995 (Wa. 2010) type challenge, right?). Any of these could have used the helping hand of a friend of the court.

The development of contemporary right to bear arms jurisprudence involved state courts citing to the courts of other states in a regular and major way. Except to discount an absolute right to bear arms under the 1822 Bliss case, courts were seen circlejerking over lesser standards or denial altogether of rights to carry. Although states have become more reliant upon their own development of jurisprudence among their courts, they still cite to other states.

There is currently a gradual increase in states achieving constitutional carry that would compound constitutional carry achieved through a judicial route. The value of this is in states whos constitutions provided models for the Second Amendment itself, and who retained their original right to bear arms provision to date, creating the foundation for the victory under the judiciary. Pennsylvania is a perfect state by which to implement the ground up attack on the 2A by using a success in that very state as a lattice.

2) Is there something wrong with lobbying the judiciary?

Congress has about 535 members. The PA General Assembly has about 253. Add to that an executive to each who could veto a bill. What is the cost to value ratio of lobbying a majority of that many people when one could lobby a little less than 3 (a Superior Court panel) or 7 (an average PA Supreme Court panel)? Although there is less direct interaction, and less 'in-pocket' activity with the judiciary, meaning a greater cost per work unit, the math does beg the question. Don't forget that part of GOA's mission purports to be "GOA has helped get strong, constitutional judges both appointed and confirmed to the federal bench. And with your help, GOA will continue to successfully defend the rights of gun owners in the courts." Why not for state courts who are every bit vested with the power to decide 2A issues? Is it wrong to write them a legal letter, too? Using the improved initiative-communication structure, such an organization would not have to spend as many resources with their important and expensive members/officials (like attorneys) drafting what other people would readily do if simply called upon or recognized for offering to contribute.

* * *

...to be continued, because I forgot some of the reasons to analyze as to why a national organization would not want to take a victory in Pennsylvania on either a 2A or Art. I, Sec. 21 position.

[Huskyoverlord]

Dude you hooked me I'm in. What do need besides money (don't have any of that) If you want me to send copies of what you write to anyone I am more then willing. One suggestion could you condense your statements alittle , it might be easier on everybody. You seem way out there smart and have a intrest and knowlage of the law. Saddly can't say the same for the people in power