Help me put an argument to rest on legal transport without LTCF...

[Glennp]

Im going to keep it short and to the point. My friend believes it is legal without a LTCF (or any reciprical license) to transport a handgun unloaded and seperate from ammunition to a destination in PA, then load it and open carry on foot.

I said no it is not legal as per 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106, since it is illegal unless you are going to or from a place of "target practice". The act of OC itself is legal but him transporting for such is against the law.

The following he cited as proof that you can do so legally but I see no relevency? Perhaps im overlooking something?
http://reference.pafoa.org/caselaw/
http://www.pafirearmslawyer.com/Open_Carry_in_PA.html
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/wu01/vc...nstitution.htm (specifically section 21)


Please cite any additional resources you may have. Thanks.

[tl_3237]

You already have the answer. Just show him 18 Pa CSA 6106 which prohibits vehicle transport unless he falls within one of the professional or activity exceptions.

Then ask to to show you which of the exceptions he is asserting.

Yes license-less OC is legal (except in Phila) but license-less vehicle carry is not unless an exception is met.

[BimmerJon]

OP, you are correct. Your friend is not.

There are more exceptions than just the range. Place of purchase, repair, etc.

[bac0nfat]

Tell your friend he's wrong, unless you are going to a range, gun store, gunsmith, vacation home, fixed place of business, or for the purpose of hunting, and tell him to stop being lazy and go get his LTCF.

[PisnNapalm]

As everyone above me has said... Your friend is wrong.

[jerkin]

Your friend referenced this site so I'm not sure why he would think that he's legal, it's been discussed here many times. If he's so sure of himself tell him to put his handgun in his vehicle and drive down the road then you call the local cops and report a man illegally transporting a firearm. That should settle it.

[twency]

I generally agree with the responses of "not legal" under PA law as stated above by various posters.

Also, as has been noted by others on this forum before, although there is a federal statute protecting interstate transport of inaccesible unloaded firearms (when the traveler may lawfully possess them at the starting and ending points of the trip), this doesn't apply to intrastate transport and so doesn't preempt PA law.

However, a thought occurs:

If he had a legally possessed inaccesible unloaded firearm in his vehicle when he started his trip from a location outside of PA, got to the place in PA (excluding Phila) where he wanted to open carry and there (once no longer operating his vehicle) accessed, loaded, and openly carried, would the FOPA potentially protect him while driving in PA because of the out-of-state starting point?

The relevant statute is http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18...6---A000-.html.

It seems like an odd result, and yet I think a strict reading of the federal statute might allow it as long as all the right steps are followed precisely.

Hypothetical example: John Doe lives in Pittsburgh (call this point A), and lawfully has a handgun in his home. He has a relative/friend/cabin/range/gunsmith/whatever in another state (call this point B), where John may go and also lawfully be in his possession of his handgun. John wants to open carry in Harrisburg (call this point C). John, using the federal interstate transport safe harbor provision for an unloaded and inaccesible handgun while travelling, travels from point A to B, then from point B to C, then loads and open carries at C, then unloads and resecures and travel from C to B, and then B to A.

Legal?

[C27433]

I generally agree with the responses of "not legal" under PA law as stated above by various posters.

Also, as has been noted by others on this forum before, although there is a federal statute protecting interstate transport of inaccesible unloaded firearms (when the traveler may lawfully possess them at the starting and ending points of the trip), this doesn't apply to intrastate transport and so doesn't preempt PA law.

However, a thought occurs:

If he had a legally possessed inaccesible unloaded firearm in his vehicle when he started his trip from a location outside of PA, got to the place in PA (excluding Phila) where he wanted to open carry and there (once no longer operating his vehicle) accessed, loaded, and openly carried, would the FOPA potentially protect him while driving in PA because of the out-of-state starting point?

The relevant statute is http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18...6---A000-.html.

It seems like an odd result, and yet I think a strict reading of the federal statute might allow it as long as all the right steps are followed precisely.

Hypothetical example: John Doe lives in Pittsburgh (call this point A), and lawfully has a handgun in his home. He has a relative/friend/cabin/range/gunsmith/whatever in another state (call this point B), where John may go and also lawfully be in his possession of his handgun. John wants to open carry in Harrisburg (call this point C). John, using the federal interstate transport safe harbor provision for an unloaded and inaccesible handgun while travelling, travels from point A to B, then from point B to C, then loads and open carries at C, then unloads and resecures and travel from C to B, and then B to A.

Legal?

IANAL but I think that stop B, being within the state of destination, stop C, would cause you to lose your protection under FOPA. IMO, FOPA should never be relied upon to protect you during interstate transport for the simple reasons that 1.) Your average LEO has no idea it exists and you would most likely be arrested if you were in violation of state law, and 2.) Using FOPA as a defense in court would be an uphill battle because the law relies on you demonstrating that you intended to go to a destination that you never actually reached since you were stopped by the LEO.

Essentially, all that FOPA is good for would be to justify that a completed journey was legal, rather than illegal. But since the journey was made successfully, you obviously didn't need its protection in the first place. The only conceivable value FOPA has is that it would protect you if you were ever being charged for a crime which required the police to investigate your activities during a span of time which included your journey from state A to state C through state B.

I'm curious, has anyone ever successfully used FOPA in their defense?

[tl_3237]

For FOPA issues check out:


http://forum.pafoa.org/concealed-ope...ml#post1648522

In essence you would have to be legal in both the states of origin and destination under each of those state's laws before you could garner FOPA protection for intervening states.

[MDJschool]

The argument cannot be put to rest, not even here. For example, I say your friend is right, because Pa. Const. art. I, sec 21, that the right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the state shall not be questioned, is superior; the will of the legislature must yield to the will of the people, and an unconstitutional act creates no duties and no rights, being void as if it had never been passed. Of course, under this, not only is unloaded transport lawful, but also is concealed carry without license or exception; § 6106 is void.

The same situation applies to the more nuclear quesiton regarding transport. The plain wording of 18 USC 926A provides that unloaded transport from any place where a person may possess and carry to any other place where a person may possess and carry carries total immunity. Yet, the Third Circuit has not only ignored that plain wording and substituted the title of the section for its requirement (note that the either the original FOPA, before it was amended within 2 years of its passage, or in the alternative, an earlier point in the bill, the word "interstate" actually appeared in the text; however, what you see now contains no such word!), but also ADDED requirements that no reasonable person could derive from the text. See Revell v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 598 F.3d 128 (3rd Cir. 2010).