In examining the preliminary objections asserting failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we turn first to the argument that the Ordinances are unenforceable because they conflict with a state statute, and Petitioners’ countervailing argument that that Section 6120 is unconstitutional because it infringes on the power of Philadelphia to pass and enforce local gun regulations. The City claims that gun regulation is a local, not a statewide, concern. In
Schneck v. City of Philadelphia, 383 A.2d 227 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978), we examined a Philadelphia ordinance which regulated the acquisition and transfer of firearms. At that time, Section 6120(a) contained language identical to that of the current version, except that it banned regulation of firearms only, not ammunition or components. Specifically, “[n]o county, municipality or township may in any manner regulate the lawful ownership, possession or transportation of firearms when carried or transported for purposes not prohibited by the laws of this commonwealth.” We enjoined Philadelphia from enforcing the ordinance because “[w]e believe[d] that this statute clearly preempt[ed] local governments from regulating the lawful ownership, possession and transportation of firearms, and we also believe[d] that Philadelphia’s ordinance attempt[ed] to regulate firearms in the manner indicated in the statute as prohibited.”
Schneck, 383 A2d. at 229-30.
Another Philadelphia gun ordinance later came before this court and then our Supreme Court.
See Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 545 Pa. 279, 681 A.2d 152 (1996),
aff’g Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 655 A.2d 194 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). In
Ortiz, the cities of Pittsburgh and Philadelphia passed ordinances banning certain types of assault weapons. Our Supreme Court characterized the matter before the courts as follows:
The sum of the case is that the Constitution of Pennsylvania requires that home rule municipalities may not perform any power denied by the General Assembly; the General Assembly has denied all municipalities the power to regulate the ownership, possession, transfer or possession of firearms; and the municipalities seek to regulate that which the General Assembly has said they may not regulate. The inescapable conclusion, unless there is more, is that the municipalities’ attempt to ban the possession of certain types of firearms is constitutionally infirm.
Ortiz, 545 Pa. at 283-84, 681 A.2d at 155. The court went on to conclude:
Because the ownership of firearms is constitutionally protected, its regulation is a matter of statewide concern. The constitution does not provide that the right to bear arms shall not be questioned in any part of the commonwealth except Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, where it may be abridged at will, but that it shall not be questioned in any part of the commonwealth. Thus, regulation of firearms is a matter of concern in all of Pennsylvania, not merely in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, and the General Assembly, not city councils, is the proper forum for the imposition of such regulation.
Ortiz, 545 Pa. at 287, 681 A.2d at 156.
The Ordinances before us are not materially different from those presented in
Schneck and
Ortiz. Each one seeks to regulate firearms—an area that both Section 6120 and binding precedent have made clear is an area of statewide concern over which the General Assembly has assumed sole regulatory power. As we stated in
Schneck, “it is a well-established principle of law that where a state statute preempts local governments from imposing regulations on a subject, any ordinances to the contrary are unenforceable.” 383 A.2d at 229.
In attempting to uphold the Ordinances, Petitioners argue that Section 6120’s qualifying phrase “when carried or transported” leaves room for municipalities to regulate any uses of firearms which do not involve carrying or transporting them. Petitioners argue that if the General Assembly intended to preempt any and all municipal gun control, it would have done so instead of including this limitation. Given Schneck and Ortiz, we cannot agree with this construction of the Firearms Act. The ordinances struck down in those cases were not qualitatively different in that respect from those at issue here. While Petitioners point out that the qualifying phrase “when carried or transported” was not specifically discussed in
Ortiz, in light of its broad and unqualified language, we cannot distinguish
Ortiz on this basis. Moreover, this language was at issue in
Schneck, 383 A.2d at 230 (Crumlish, Jr., J., dissenting). There, the dissenting opinion quoted the trial court’s discussion:
In an even broader inquiry, is the declared “limitation” on the power of a municipality to regulate “lawful ownership, possession or transportation of firearms’ confined, as defendants assert, to certain statutorily enumerated events only, i.e., ‘when carried or transported for purposes not prohibited by
the laws of this Commonwealth.” Or, as asserted by plaintiffs, has the total field of the regulation of firearms been preempted by the Commonwealth so that this clause, which invites a more limited intention, is to be modified by interpretation?
Id. The majority concluded that Section 6120 “clearly preempts local governments from regulating the lawful ownership, possession and transportation of firearms[.]”
Id. at 229-30. Thus we must conclude that binding precedent precludes our accepting Petitioners’ argument on this point.