[ImminentDanger]

Here are additional cases that have some relevance/interest:

ALABAMA v. WHITE - June 11, 1990
(US Supreme Court 89-789)
http://supreme.justia.com/us/496/325/case.html

in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 490 U. S. 7 (1989):
"The officer [making a Terry stop] . . . must be able to articulate something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.'" [Terry, 392 U.S.] at 392 U. S. 27 . The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal

496 U. S. Page 330
level of objective justification" for making the stop. INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210 (1984). That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. We have held that probable cause means "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found," [Gates, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 238], and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than for probable cause."

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. Adams v. Williams, supra, demonstrates as much. We there assumed that the unverified tip from the known informant might not have been reliable enough to establish probable cause, but nevertheless found it sufficiently reliable to justify a Terry stop. 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 147. Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors -- quantity and quality -- are considered in the "totality of the circumstances -- the whole picture," United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 449 U. S. 417 (1981), that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.

KNOWLES v. IOWA - December 8,1998
(US Supreme Court 97-7597)
http://supreme.justia.com/us/525/113/case.html

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We have recognized that the first rationale-officer safety-is "'both legitimate and weighty,'" Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 412 (1997) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 110 (1977) (per curiam)). The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' ... than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest ... a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").

This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full field-type search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they

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may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry pat down" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).

COMMONWEALTH v. WITHERSPOON - July 3, 2000
(PA Superior Court J. A22031/00)
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Sup.../a22031_00.pdf

J. A22031/00 - 6 -
The question then arises as to whether the police may continue to detain a citizen subsequent to issuing a citation or warning without any other indication that additional crimes were afoot.

¶9 Pennsylvania jurisprudence conditions the answer upon whether the police officer first informs the detainee that he or she is free to leave. In Commonwealth v. Lopez, 609 A.2d 177 (Pa.Super. 1992), prior to returning his license, registration, and car rental agreement, the police continued to question Lopez and finally asked him if he would consent to a search. This Court found that Lopez was not free to leave as he could not do so legally,(3) and held that the continued detention constituted an
(3 The police still held his paperwork.)

J. A22031/00 - 7 -
unreasonable Fourth Amendment seizure. See id. at 182; see also Commonwealth v. Parker, 619 A.2d 735 (Pa.Super. 1993).

¶10 The courts, however, have reached an opposite conclusion when the police officer asks the detainee to consent to a search if the officer first returns the detainee’s paperwork and informs him that he is free to leave. See Commonwealth v. Hoak, 700 A.2d 1263 (Pa.Super. 1997) (en banc), aff’d by an equally divided court, 734 A.2d 1275 (Pa. 1999). Whenever the surrounding circumstances indicate that police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business, the investigative detention converts into a mere encounter with all of its attendant consequences. Commonwealth v. Prosek, 700 A.2d 1305, 1309 (Pa.Super. 1997) (citing Hoak, 700 A.2d at 1268). One consequence of a mere encounter is that neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause is required to foster the contact. As long as the detainee knows that he is not bound to answer the police officer’s questions, he may voluntarily consent to a valid search.