[ImminentDanger]

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EXCERPTS FROM REFERENCED CASES BELOW:
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COMMONWEALTH v. AYALA - FEBRUARY 6, 2002
(PA Superior Court J. S65035/01
http://www.romingerlegal.com/pacasel...s65035_01.html

"To secure the right of citizens to be free from such intrusions, courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens as those interactions become more intrusive."
Id.
The first of these [interactions] is a "mere encounter" (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or respond.

The second, an "investigative detention" must be supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest.

Finally, an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause.

COMMONWEALTH v. HAYWARD - JUNE 27, 2000
(PA Superior Court J. S05037/2000)
http://www.romingerlegal.com/pacasel...s05037_00.html

9
Our Supreme Court has recognized that there are three categories of interaction between citizens and the police:

The first of these is a "mere encounter" (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991).

The second, an "investigative detention" must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d.317 (1984); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

Finally an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed. 2d 824 (1979); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 532 Pa. 62, 614 A.2d 1378 (1992)(footnote omitted). Commonwealth v. Ellis, 541 Pa. 285, 293-294, 662 A.2d 1043, 1047-1048 (1995). Accord In Re Evans, 717 A.2d 542, 544 (Pa.Super. 1998).

10 As our Court has recently stated: In determining whether a "mere encounter" has risen to the level of an "investigative detention," the focus of our inquiry is on whether a "seizure" of the person has occurred. Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 552 Pa. 484, 715 A.2d 1117, 1120 (Pa. 1998). Within this context, our courts employ the following objective standard to discern whether a person has been seized: "Whether, under all the circumstances surrounding the incident at issue, a reasonable person would believe he was free to leave." Commonwealth v. Smith, 1999 PA Super 96, 732 A.2d 1226, 1232 (Pa. Super. 1999) (emphasis added). See also Commonwealth v. Matos, 543 Pa. 449, 672 A.2d 769, 774 (Pa. 1996). Commonwealth v. McClease, 2000 PA Super 91, 13, 750 A.2d 320, (Pa.Super. 2000).

COMMONWEALTH v. HAWKINS - APRIL 22, 1997
(PA Supreme Court J-257-1996)

Thus, before police may briefly detain a person, there must be reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, and before police may pat down for weapons, there must be a reasonable belief that the suspect is presently armed and dangerous.

The Commonwealth takes the radical position that police have a duty to stop and frisk when they receive information from any source that a suspect has a gun. Since it is not illegal to carry a licensed gun in Pennsylvania,(4) it is difficult to see where this shocking idea originates, notwithstanding the Commonwealth's fanciful and histrionic references to maniacs who may spray schoolyards with gunfire and assassins of public figures who may otherwise go undetected. Even if the Constitution of Pennsylvania would permit such invasive police activity as the Commonwealth proposes -- which it does not -- such activity seems more likely to endanger than to protect the public. Unnecessary police intervention, by definition, produces the possibility of conflict where none need exist.

Contrary to the Commonwealth's view, the public will receive its full measure of protection by police who act within the restraints imposed on them by Art. I, § 8 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania and this court's relevant caselaw. Upon receiving unverified information that a certain person is engaged in illegal activity, the police may always observe the suspect and conduct their own investigation. If police surveillance produces a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, the suspect may, of course, be briefly stopped and questioned (the Terry investigative stop), and, if the officer has reasonable fear for his safety, police may pat down the suspect's outer garments for weapons.(5)

In this case, the police acted on an anonymous tip and had no basis for believing that the tip was reliable. They also had no independent reason to believe that the suspect may have been involved in criminal activity. But Queen requires that "a stop and frisk may be supported by a police radio bulletin _only_ if evidence is offered at the suppression hearing establishing the articulable facts which support the reasonable suspicion." 536 Pa. at 320, ___ A.2d at ___. Here, no facts were offered which supported the suspicion created by the anonymous call.

(4) In all parts of Pennsylvania, persons who are licensed may carry concealed firearms. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108. Except in Philadelphia, firearms may be carried openly without a license. See Ortiz v. Commonwealth, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 681 A.2d 152, 155 (1996) (only in Philadelphia must a person obtain a license for carrying a firearm whether it is unconcealed or concealed; in other parts of the Commonwealth, unconcealed firearms do not require a license).

(5) We do not address the scenario in which the officer has an independent reason to believe that a crime (carrying an unlicensed gun) may be in progress, inquires as to whether the gun is licensed and the person does not answer.